Static analysis (aka offline analysis) of a model of an IP network is useful for understanding, debugging, and verifying packet flow properties of the network. There have been static analysis approaches proposed in the literature for networks based on model checking as well as graph reachability. Abstract interpretation is a method that has typically been applied to static analysis of programs. We propose a new, abstract-interpretation based approach for analysis of networks. We formalize our approach, mention its correctness guarantee, and demonstrate its flexibility in addressing multiple network-analysis problems that have been previously solved via tailor-made approaches. Finally, we investigate applications of our analysis for two novel problems -automatically generating test packets, and inferring a high-level policy for the network -which have been addressed in the past only in the restricted single-node setting.
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the flow of packets across an IP network is an important problem. It has varied applications, such as identifying anomalies in configuration files in routers [15] , testing of router implementations [5] , checking whether a network configuration satisfies a high-level policy of a network administrator by querying properties of the configuration [9, 11] , and inferring such a high-level policy automatically from the network configuration [12, 6] . However, such an analysis is challenging, because packet routing in an IP network is a complex activity. Routers intervene between subnets (i.e., fully connected collections of hosts), and perform operations on packets such as filtering, routing to adjacent routers or subnets, and transformation, e.g., for network address translation (NAT). Each operation performed by a router is predicated (i.e., guarded) by the current content of the header of the packet, which, due to transformations, changes as the packet flows through the network. There are additional sources of complexity: The set of operations performed by a router is not fixed once for all, but gets modified as the network topology and load characteristics vary during operation. Also, the outcome of some of these operations are dependent not just on the content of the packet header, but also on the state of the connection that the packet belongs to. All of this means that it is quite difficult to analyze the flow of packets across the network.
The state-of-practice for analyzing reachability is to send test packets in the actual network, using commercially available tools. However, testing does not give complete information about all possible packet flow outcomes, because it is infeasible to send all possible packets across a network. Several static (or offline) analysis approaches, e.g., [14, 15, 1] , have been reported in the literature in order to overcome this disadvantage; these approaches analyze a specification of the network topology and router configurations (i.e., a model of the network), and emit information that over-or under-approximates all possible packet flows in the network.
Contributions

1)
Our primary contribution is an abstract interpretation [4] based analysis for determining packet flow properties in an IP network. To the best of our knowledge ours is the first reported approach for this problem that is based on abstract interpretation, which is a technique that has been typically applied to analysis of properties of programs. Abstract interpretation is a customizable framework, in the sense that it needs to be instantiated with a lattice (i.e., a domain of values to be used in the analysis), and a set of transfer functions operating on this lattice. Therefore, the analysis designer has the flexibility to use different lattices of differing precision for the same problem, and prove that each one results in a semantically valid (but potentially approximate) analysis wrt the most-precise analysis. We take advantage of this capability by first spelling out a precise instantiation of our analysis, which always terminates (because of bounded packet sizes), but which may be expensive. Subsequently, we illustrate how to trade-off this precision for scalability, while ensuring that the flow information we compute is an over-approximation of the precise flows. Previous static analysis approaches for network analysis are hard-wired, and do not readily admit such trade-offs within their overall approach.
2) We show that abstract interpretation is a flexible framework, capable of determining varying information about packet flows in a network. The first variant of our analysis, discussed in Section 4, computes a formula for each intermediate router that describes the set of packets that reach that router. Determining reachability at intermediate nodes (i.e., routers) has many applications, such as querying network policy [9, 11] , and identifying rule anomalies and router mis-configurations [15] . The above-mentioned approaches employ custom solutions, which miss certain packet flows (and hence may be unsound) in the presence of cycles in the network. The problems addressed by these approaches can be solved as straightforward postpasses after our sound and generic reachability analysis.
The second variant of our analysis, discussed in Section 5, computes information at each intermediate router that not only represents the set of packets reaching that router, but also the original forms of these packets as when they left their originating subnets (before they were transformed by address translation along the way).
3) We propose a novel application of our analysis. In previous work [12, 6] researchers have formulated the problem of inferring a high-level policy of the network, in the restricted setting of single-router networks. We first generalize this problem to the setting of a network of multiple routers, and then show how to solve it using the second variant of our analysis.
RELATED WORK
The previous static analysis techniques for IP networks that most closely resemble ours are the ones based on transitive closure analysis [14] , and graph propagation with bounded unfolding of cycles [9, 11, 15] . All of these approaches compute packet reachability information at all nodes in the network. The work of Xie et al [14] is the seminal work in the area of formally specified static analysis of networks. For each pair of nodes i, j in the network, they compute using Warshall's transitive closure analysis a formula that represents the set of packets leaving i that eventually reach j along all possible paths. Xie et al pioneered the idea of uniformly treating filtering and NATing as transformations on (representations of) sets of concrete packets. The other approaches mentioned above, rather than using transitive closure, propagate (representations of) sets of packets explicitly along the edges in the network model. Our approach is similar to these approaches in this regard.
The approaches mentioned above do not soundly analyze packet flows along cyclic paths (i.e., they may miss certain packet flow). Consider the example in Fig. 1 . Part (b) of this figure shows the configuration rules in the firewalls F1 and F2, in plain English form for the sake of clarity. Basically, F2 is a trusted subsidiary firewall that F1 sends all packets to for the sake of filtering. Therefore, e.g., a packet from Z1 addressed to Z2 takes the following (cyclic) path: Z1-F1-F2-F1-Z2. This example, although trivial, illustrates the subsidiary-firewall idiom commonly employed by network administrators to avoid overloading key firewalls (F1, in this case). The cycle in this path is not a "useless" cycle, in the sense that certain end-to-end flows can happen only through this cycle. In general, for any integer k, it is possible to construct a cycle going through k routers such that certain packets entering the cycle leave it only after
• F1 forwards all packets from Z1 or Z2 to F2 along the F1-F2 link on the right side.
• F2 filters out bad packets, SNATs src address field of good packets to a trusted address T , and forwards them to F1 along F2-F1 link on left side.
• F1 forwards all packets that have src address T (i.e., verified packets) to Z1 or Z2, based on their destination address.
(b) going through the cycle k times. Therefore, unrolling all loops a fixed number of times (which is the idea behind the approached mentioned above) is not sufficient. Abstract interpretation involves an iterative analysis until a fix-point is reached, and hence cleanly addresses this situation. Model checking is another technique has been widely used in the literature [10, 7, 1] for static analysis of networks. While the former two approaches model the flow of a single packet through the network, Al Shaer's approach [1] models transitions of the set of all packets in a network. Since packet sizes in IP networks are bounded, model-checking in this domain is capable of precise analysis even in the presence of cycles. Additionally, model checking can directly answer general temporal properties, in additional to reachability (abstract interpretation can answer restricted forms of temporal properties, too, based on the abstraction chosen). Model checking, like abstract interpretation, can also use abstract domains to compute approximate solutions, e.g., as in the Slam [3] approach (although the existing model-checking based approaches for packet flow analysis do not do this). The unique aspect of abstract interpretation is the formalism that explicitly maps the abstract values in the abstract lattice used to concrete values in the concrete domain (e.g., sets of packets), and uses this mapping as well as the properties of the given abstract transfer functions to prove that the analysis is sound (i.e., computes an over-approximation of the precise information).
MODEL AND TERMINOLOGY
A concrete packet is an IP packet in a network. We only model the headers of packets; let pkSz be the total number of bits in a packet header, partitioned into nFlds fields. We denote the fields of a packet p as p.f1, p.f2, . . . , p.fp. These fields include the source address and port, and destination address and port. Let Pk represent the domain of all concrete packets.
We now describe our model of a network. A network consists of a set of nodes N, which are partitioned into two categories: a set of zones (i.e. subnets) Z, which are terminal nodes, and a set of firewalls (i.e., routers) F, which are intermediate nodes. We use zones to model organizational subnets as single units; i.e., we assume that each zone z has a set of publicly visible IP addresses addr z (with the sets of distinct zones being non-overlapping), and that a packet leaving or entering a zone contains only public IP addresses of that zone or other zones in its header. We use n, ni, etc., to represent individual nodes, z, zi, etc., to denote individual zones, and f, fi, etc., to denote individual firewalls. Each zone has a single interface connected to the outside world, while each firewall has a set of one or more interfaces. E is an irreflexive, symmetric, binary relation on the set of all interfaces in the network, representing the physical links between the interfaces; for any link (i1, i2) ∈ E, we assume that i1 and i2 do not belong to the same firewall. We use node(i) to denote the zone or firewall to which interface i belongs. When we say (m, i1) → (n, i2), we mean (i1, i2) ∈ E, node(i1) = m, and node(i2) = n.
We now describe our model of how each firewall is configured; this is based on the widely used package Iptables [2] . Each firewall f has four tables: a DNATing table f.dnat, a filtering table f.filt, an SNATing table f.snat, and a routing table f.rt. Each packet entering a firewall through any of its interfaces goes through the first three tables above, in the order mentioned, and finally leaves through an interface as decided by the routing table. We assume that firewalls are pure routers; i.e., they don't create or ultimately accept packets. A filtering table is a sequence of filtering rules, while each of the two NATing tables is a sequence of NATing rules. Each rule r (filtering or NATing) has two components: its "guard" r.grd , which is a propositional formula on the bits in a packet header, and "action" r.act. A concrete packet c is said to match a rule r if c satisfies the formula p.grd . A packet entering a table is matched against each rule in the table sequentially until a matching rule is found; the matching rule's action is then taken on the packet, and the remaining rules are ignored. For a filtering rule r its action is either DROP or ACCEPT; if a packet matches a filtering rule r, it is thrown away if r.act is DROP, and is sent out as output from the table if r.act is ACCEPT. The final rule in any filtering table has the guard true (i.e., is a default rule). For any NATing rule f , r.NAT field is a number which represents the field in the packet header that is being NATed, while r.act is a formula representing a range of values. If the NATing rule matches a packet c then c.r.NAT field is overwritten with one of the values in r.act, and the hence transformed packet is sent out as output from the table. If no rule in a NATing table matched a packet it is sent out untransformed. DNATing rules write into the destination address or port field, while SNATing rules write into the source address or port field. The routing table f.rt of firewall f is a function from the interfaces in f to formulas, each of which is a constraint on destination addresses; i.e., if a packet c, after having gone through the DNAT, filtering, and SNAT tables in a firewall, has destination address d, it is then sent out of one of the interfaces i of f such that d satisfies the formula f.rt(i).
Note in the discussion above that choices may have to be taken by NATing rules as well as during the final routing step. We do not model how these choices are made during network operation, and instead, in our analysis, assume that all choices are possible. Also, we assume the following on the flow of concrete packets in the network: (a) There is no IP spoofing; i.e., every packet leaving a zone z has a source address that matches addr z , and a source port that is within the valid port-range of z. (b) Every packet that enters the network from a zone eventually reaches a zone 1. p.curr : Formula representing the set of concrete packets represented by p. 2. p.orig: Formula representing the set of original packets leaving a zone that, after flowing through the network, become the packets represented by curr. 3. p.ifNated: A vector of bits, one per field in a packet header. p.ifNated.b i is 1 means p.curr .f i contains a value written by NATing (by some firewall). Note: The fields orig and ifNated are used only by the second variant of our algorithm, discussed in Section 5.
(a)
1: Inputs: (1) A network configuration, (2) an originating zone z 0 , (3) an abstract lattice, whose elements are abstract values, (4) an "initial" abstract value z 0 .from at zone z 0 , and (5) transfer functions for links.
2:
Outputs: For each node n, an abstract value n.abs (representing the set of concrete packets that could reach n).
3: 4:
Initialize z 0 .abs to z 0 .from. Mark z. 5: For all nodes n other than z initialize n.abs to ⊥ (the bottom element of the abstract lattice).
6: while there exist marked nodes do 7: Choose a marked node m, and unmark it.
Replace n.abs with n.abs ff (i 1 ,i 2 ) (m.abs).
10:
If node n was unmarked, or if new value of n.abs different from old value, then mark n.
11: end for 12: end while z that it is supposed to reach (i.e., its destination address when it reaches z matches addr z ), or gets dropped by a filtering rule before it reaches any zone.
THE BASE ALGORITHM
Instantiating an abstract interpretation requires us to specify (a) an abstract lattice, whose elements are called abstract values, which is closed wrt the join operation (i.e., least upper bound, or ) (b) a directed graph on which the analysis is to be performed, (c) transfer functions for the edges in the graph, which specify the abstract propagation semantics of the edges (as functions from abstract values to abstract values), and (d) the initial abstract value at some designated originating node z0 of the graph. In our setting the nodes in the network are the graph nodes, and each link (m, i1) → (n, i2) in the network results in a graph edge m → n. We show the abstract interpretation algorithm in Fig. 2(b) ; this is basically Kildall's algorithm [8] , instantiated to our setting. The idea behind the algorithm is to keep track of an abstract value m.abs at each node m. In our setting, each abstract value is a set of abstract packets from the domain AbsPk , where each abstract packet in turn intuitively represents a set of concrete packets. Whenever the abstract value m.abs at a node m changes it is propagated through each outgoing link (m, i1) → (n, i2) out of m (see lines 8-11) using the transfer function ff (i 1 ,i 2 ) of the link to the successor node n of the link; at n this incoming value is joined with the current abstract value at n. The algorithm terminates when the abstract values at all nodes stabilize (i.e., reach a fix-point); these values represent the result of the algorithm.
Both variants of our algorithm share the basic structure mentioned above. However, they differ in the content of the abstract packets, and in the join operation and the transfer functions. We discuss the initial variant of the algorithm in this section, and the second variant in the next section. For the initial variant each abstract value is a singleton set, i.e., a single abstract packet. Each abstract packet p, in turn, is a structure with a single field curr , which is a propositional formula on the bits b0, b1, . . . , b pkSz in a packet header; see Fig. 2(a) , ignoring the fields orig and ifNated for now (they are used by the second variant of our algorithm). An abstract packet p represents exactly the set of concrete packets that satisfy the formula p.curr . For instance, assuming packet headers have only three bits, the formula b2 ∧ ¬b0 represents the set of packet headers {100, 110}. This is formalized using the mapping γ from abstract packets to sets of concrete packets, and its inverse mapping α:
γ(p) = {c | c is a concrete packet, and c satisfies p.curr } α(s) = p, such that γ(p) = s Since the abstract packet n.abs at a node n is meant to represent the set of concrete packets that reach node n along all possible paths, it is natural for the join operator to be logical OR; i.e., p1 p2 = p3, where p3.curr = p1.curr ∨p1.curr . The "initial" abstract value z0.from at the originating zone z0 is an abstract packet such that its formula curr is satisfied by all concrete packets whose source address is in addr z 0 . The transfer functions are shown in the appendix; ignore the statements labeled "Variant 2" or "Inferring policy" for now. Routine filter tableTF (t, In) in Section A.2 is the pseudocode for the transfer function for a filtering table t; (In is the set of abstract packets coming into t, while the return value is the set of abstract packets that come out of t. Similarly, nat tableTF (t, ) in Appendix A.4 is the pseudo-code for the transfer function for a NATing table t. For each filtering or NATing table t its transfer function ff t has the signature AbsPk → AbsPk , and captures the sequential effect of all the rules in the table. For any abstract packet p, the abstract packet ff t (p) represents precisely the set of concrete packets that would result when the concrete packets represented by p flow through the table.
The routine filter ruleTF (r, p) in Appendix A.1 is the pseudo-code for the transfer function for an individual filtering rule r, applied to an incoming abstract packet p. Similarly, the routine nat ruleTF (r, p) in Appendix A.3 is for the transfer function for an individual NATing rule r. In both these transfer functions an incoming abstract packet could get split into two outgoing abstract packets, one that matches the rule (and gets the formula p.curr ∧ r.grd ), and one that does not match the rule (and gets the formula p.curr ∧ ¬r.grd ). In addition, each NATing rule r updates the field indicated by r.NAT field of the incoming packet p, by writing into this field the values in the range r.act. This is accomplished by subroutine natPacket(p, r). The transfer function ff (i 1 ,i 2 ) of a link (m, i1) → (n, i2) is shown in Appendix A.5, and is the only transfer function to be invoked directly by our propagation algorithm in Fig. 2 . It works as follows: When given an abstract packet p, it routes the packet through the tables m.dnat, m.filt, and m.snat, in that order. Finally, it refines the packet to exclude concrete packets that it represents that have destination addresses that do not satisfy the formula m.rt(i1).
For an illustration consider the example network in Fig. 3(a) Rule 5) . This range corresponds to packets that came originally from Z1 and were NATed by F1. Consider a run of our algorithm starting from zone Z1. No abstract packet reaches zone Z3, because F2 denies access from Z1. The abstract packet reaching each other zone is shown in Fig. 3(c) . Our notation is as follows: The text inside each pair of angled brackets is an abstract packet. There are two components inside each abstract packet p, delimited by square brackets. The first component is p.curr ; ignore the second component for now. For convenience, we denote the formula p.curr as a pair of constraints on the source and destination fields, respectively, separated by a colon.
Correctness and complexity
The abstract interpretation framework guarantees termination and correctness as long as the instantiation (i.e., the lattice, and the transfer functions) satisfy certain sufficient conditions (we refer you to Cousot and Cousot's paper [4] for the details of the sufficient conditions). Since the formula n.abs.curr at any node n keeps monotonically getting weaker (due to joins), and since the number of distinct formulas is finite (due to the fixed packet width), the algorithm is guaranteed to reach a fix point and terminate.
Our transfer functions are precise, in the sense described earlier. Also, our abstract lattice is precise, in the sense that for any set s of concrete packets, γ(α(s)) = s (the abstract lattice is called imprecise if for any set s we have γ(α(s)) ⊃ s). Therefore, our analysis is precise; i.e., the final abstract packet n.abs at each node n represents precisely the set of concrete packets that will eventually flow through n (after passing through all its three tables) assuming an initial configuration wherein all concrete packets represented by the abstract packet z0.from start out from zone z0.
Reachability analysis in networks is an NP-complete problem [7] (on the packet size). In the worst case there could be an exponential number of paths to a node n in a network and the abstract packet n.abs.curr at this node could in the worst-case be updated O(2 pkSz ) times during a run of the algorithm. Our precise abstract-interpretation formulation described so far, therefore, will have similar running time requirement as model checking approaches reported in the literature [10, 7] , which also answer reachability.
Precision-efficiency trade-offs
A key benefit of abstract interpretation is that it uses a join operation to merge abstract values reaching any node; therefore, it is possible to tweak the abstract packet structure, as well as the join operation to improve efficiency (by reducing precision). We illustrate this idea by considering one such optimization. Rather than have a single formula describing all the p.curr bits in the packet header, we model an abstract packet p as a sequence of formulas curr 1, curr 2, . . . , curr nFlds , where nFlds is the number of fields in a packet header. This is typically called an independent attribute analysis in the program analysis literature, as opposed to a relational (i.e., precise) analysis. AND and OR operations are now done separately on each pair of formulas (of corresponding fields), while NOT of any sequence of formulas is approximated as true (otherwise, the negation of an abstract packet could result in exponential number of abstract packets). Therefore, the worst-case number of updates to the abstract packet at any node during a run of the algorithm is now O(nFlds * 2 fldSz ), where fldSz is the number of bits in the largest field. This is exponential on the size of the longest individual field, as opposed to being an exponential on the total size of the packet, which is a significant gain in practice. While this analysis may over-approximate the packet flows in the network, it still has value; e.g., if it says that a certain (undesirable) packet flow is not possible, this is guaranteed to be the case. Also, one could start with an imprecise analysis, and then progressively improve its precision using the idea of counter-example guided abstraction refinement, e.g., as in Slam [3] , until the undesirable packet Figure 4 : Optimized join operation flow to be verified is proved with certainty to be either possible or impossible.
EXTENDED ALGORITHM
In the first variant of our algorithm, discussed in the previous section, the field p.curr of any abstract packet p represents the set of packets that have reached the node where p resides. Note that due to NATing, the current form of these packets (as represented by p.curr ) could be different from their original form when they originally left the designated source zone z0. In this variant of the algorithm we extend the abstract packet to have another field p.orig, which represents the original forms of the packets represented by p.curr when they left z0. This information, which basically augments the reachability information, is likely to be useful in a variety of bug detection, understanding, and verification tasks. We explore a specific application of this analysis later in this section.
In this variant an abstract value (i.e., abstract lattice element) is a possibly non-singleton set of abstract packets. The "initial" abstract value z0.from leaving the zone z0 is a singleton set containing an abstract packet p whose curr and orig formulas are identical, and are satisfied by all concrete packets whose source address is in addr z 0 .
As before, we formalize the semantics of each abstract packet by defining α, γ maps that relate abstract packets to concrete packets. To enable this we first extend our model of the concrete packets. We let each concrete packet c have two fields c.curr and c.orig, the first one of which represents its current contents, and keeps changing as the packet flows through NATing rules, while the second one is fixed, retaining its original form throughout. Now: γ(P ) = p∈P γ(p), where P is a set of abstr. packets γ(p) = {c | c is a conc. packet, c.curr satisfies p.curr , c.orig satisfies p.orig}, where p is an abstract packet α(C) = P , such that γ(P ) = C, where C is a set of concrete packets. In other words, the correctness guarantee of the algorithm is that if an abstract packet p is in the set n.abs at some node n, then for every concrete packet c1 that satisfies the formula p.orig and for every concrete packet c2 that satisfies the formula p.curr there is a path in the network from z0 to n such that c1 is in z0.from and c1 becomes transformed to c2 by the time it reaches n along the path.
In this setting a precise way to define join of two sets of abstract packets P1 and P2 is set union. However, we present an optimized version of this join in Fig. 4 which is still precise, and is sufficient to guarantee the correctness property mentioned above.
The transfer functions for this new lattice are the same ones discussed earlier (shown in the appendix), except that the lines labeled "Variant 2" are now included; ignore the lines labeled "Inferring policy" for now. The changes to transfer functions filter ruleTF ( , ) and nat ruleTF ( , ) can be summarized as follows: as each packet flows through a rule, the "orig" version is refined using the guard of the rule, but only updating the fields that have not been NATed yet. We keep track of which fields in p have been NATed so far by any firewall along the path along which p flowed, using an auxiliary bit p.ifNated .b l for each field l in the packet header. The "orig" formula is not refined for fields that have been NATed because for a NATed field the rule refers to the new (NATed) value, and not the original value.
There are additional changes in the transfer function nat ruleTF (r, p). If the field r.NAT field of p is being NATed for the first time in the history of this packet, we first extract the content of field l from p.curr (which still represents the original value of this field when the packet left its source zone) and copy it to the corresponding field in p.orig. This is done by calling routine update original packet( , ). We then update the field r.NAT field in p.curr by calling the natPacket( , ) (this is the same as in Variant 1 of the algorithm).
The transfer function described above is precise, in the sense that for any abstract packet p and any NATing table t, the abstract packet ff t (p) represents precisely the set of concrete packets that would result when the concrete packets represented by p flow through the table. The net result of this is that for any abstract packet p at a node n, p.orig precisely captures the original forms of the packets leaving z0 that reach n and that are represented by p.curr .
The semantics of the copying of field l from p.curr to p.orig, mentioned above, can be stated more precisely is as follows. We extract the original content of this field from p.curr as a formula m l , which represents the set s l of original concrete bit sequences that reside in field l of concrete packets represented by p before the NATing happens. We then update the formula p.orig, such that all concrete packets represented by it now have a bit sequence from s l in their l field, but whose other fields are undisturbed.
Consider again the example in Fig. 3 , where we run the analysis starting from zone Z1. Note that a single abstract packet p (delimited by angle brackets) reaches zone Z4 (see Part (c) of the figure). The first component inside this abstract packet denotes p.curr ; note that its source address is the address range 202.67.34.6-10 that was written by the NAT rule in F1. The second component denotes p.orig; note that its source address is the original source address range of the packet leaving Z1 (i.e., 10.192 .29.1-255).
Application: Inferring a high-level policy of a network
Real-life networks can be large, with 5-500 intermediate routers [14] . Configuring these routers correctly is a complex and error-prone task. In a study of 37 real firewalls Wool [13] found that each one of them was misconfigured, and had security vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is important for network administrators to have access to tools that infer a compact, high-level policy from a network that has already been setup, to help them debug and validate the configuration. Tongaonkar et al [12] and Horowitz et al [6] have proposed inferring a policy for a single firewall. In both these approaches the initial step is to find the rules that have overlapping guards, and then to present a transformed, or differently organized version of the ruleset. While Tongaonkar et al flatten the ruleset, by eliminating all overlap between them, Horowitz et al organize the rules hierarchically, with rules with weaker guards placed "above" rules with stronger guards. These ideas do not extend cleanly to the setting of multiple firewalls connected as a network. Due to the large number of rules in real networks, and because different sets of rules may be correlated along different paths in a network, it is not clear that rule correlations can be presented in a natural, compact manner in this setting.
Our hypothesis is that in many cases it would help the administrator if for each zone z, they are simply given an "accept" formula that characterizes the set of packet headers that leave z that eventually reach some other zone, and a "reject" formula that characterizes the set of packet headers leaving z that get dropped by some rule. The two sets may, in general, be overlapping; a non-empty overlap should be a matter of concern to the administrator, because packets matching both these formulas may reach some zone, or none at all, depending on the (non-deterministic) route they take through the network. This pair of formulas for zone z is a high-level policy, in the sense that it is compact, and conveys useful end-to-end information whose representation is not tied to the actual way in the which the network configuration has been set up.
The first step in determining this high-level policy is to run our analysis treating z as the "originating" zone z0. Then, the "accept" formula for zone z is simply
zi.abs.orig
If the set of all filtering rules in the network with DROP as the action is represented by D then the "drop" formula for z is r∈D r.dropped packets where r.dropped packets is the set of packets (in their original form) that match (and are hence dropped by) rule r. These sets are anyway computed by our algorithm described above during the normal propagation. Therefore, to support this application, we simply save these sets during propagation (see the line with the comment "Inferring policy" in the routine filter ruleTF ( , ) in Appendix A.1), and use them here to construct the "drop" formulas.
In the example in Fig. 3 , the "accept" formula for origin zone Z1 is which corresponds to Z2.abs.orig ∨ Z4.abs.orig. The "reject" formula for Z1 is 
CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel abstract-interpretation based approach for packet flow analysis in IP networks. We provided two different variants of the approach, for inferring different properties, and provided formal claims of precision of the analysis. We also illustrated the flexibility of abstract interpretation in trading precision off for efficiency gains. While we have taken the first steps in this direction, there are several more-complex packet-flow analysis settings to which we would like to extend abstract interpretation. These include (a) accounting for transient changes in network configuration and topology precisely (transient changes are modeled by the transitive-closure-based approach of Xie et al [14] ), (b) addressing connection-oriented routing (i.e., stateful filters), (c) and answering (restricted) forms of temporal properties of networks. These settings lead to a much larger and richer state-space than what we have considered in this work. Previous approaches have not addressed all these issues together; our belief is that abstraction will be a key ingredient in addressing them with reasonable precision and scalability.
